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Markovsky algorithm on i-invertibile groupoids
Nadeghda N. Malyutina and Alexandra V. Scerbacova and Victor A.
Shcherbacov
Abstract. We propose modification of Markovsky crypto-algorithm [2, 3, 4] on n-ary
groupoids [1] that are invertible on at least one place.
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We continue researches of applications of n-ary groupoids that are invertible on i-th place
in cryptology [5].
It is clear that Markovsky crypto-algorithm which is based on binary or n-ary quasigroup
has better “mixing properties” than proposed algorithm.
But from the other side it is well known [6, 7] that binary (n-ary) quasigroup used in
Markovsky algorithm is its key. It is clear that number of i-invertible n-groupoids (number n
is fixed) is more then number of n-ary quasigroups (number n is fixed).
Definition 1. n-Ary groupoid pQ, fq is called invertible on the i-th place, i P 1, n, if the equa-
tion fpa1, . . . , ai´1, xi, ai`1, . . . , anq “ an`1 has unique solution for any elements: a1, . . . , ai´1,
ai`1, . . . , an, an`1 P Q [1].
In this case operation pi,n`1qfpa1, . . . , ai´1, an`1, ai`1, . . . , anq “ xi is defined in unique way
and we have:
fpa1, . . . , ai´1,
pi,n`1qfpa1, . . . , ai´1, an`1, ai`1, . . . , anq, ai`1, . . . , anq “ an`1,
pi,n`1qfpa1, . . . , ai´1, fpa1, . . . , ai´1, xi, ai`1, . . . , anq, ai`1, . . . , anq “ xi.
(1)
A translation of i-invertible n-ary groupoid pQ, fq (n ą 2) will be denoted as T pa1, . . . ,
ai´1,´, ai`1, . . . , anq, where ai P Q for all i P 1, n and
T pa1, . . . , ai´1,´, ai`1, . . . , anqx “ fpa1, . . . , ai´1, x, ai`1, . . . , anq
for all x P Q.
From the definition of i-invertible n-ary groupoid pQ, fq it follows that any translation of
the groupoid pQ, fq is a permutation of the set Q. In the next lemma we suppose that i “ n.
It is clear that next lemma is true for any other value of variable i.
Lemma 2. If fT pa1, . . . , an´1,´q is a translation of an i-invertible n-groupoid pQ, fq, then
fT
´1pa1, . . . , an´1,´q “ pn,n`1qfT pa1, . . . , an´1,´q.
Proof. In the proof we omit the symbol f in the notation of translations of the groupoid pQ, fq.
We have
T´1pa1, . . . , an´1,´qpT pa1, . . . , an´1,´qxq “
T´1pa1, . . . , an´1,´qfpa1, . . . , an´1, xq “
pn,n`1qfpa1, . . . , an´1, fpa1, . . . , an´1, xqq
p1q
“ x.
(2)
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Algorithm 3. Let Q be a non-empty finite alphabet and k be a natural number, ui, vi P Q,
i P t1, ..., ku. Define an n-ary groupoid pQ, fq which is invertible on n-th place. It is clear that
groupoid pQ, pn, n`1qfq is defined in a unique way.
Take the fixed elements l
pn2´nq{2
1
(li P Q), which are called leaders.
Let u1u2...uk be a k-tuple of letters from Q, a, b, c, d, . . . are natural numbers.
v1 “ T
apl1, l2, . . . , ln´1, u1q,
v2 “ T
bpln, ln`1, . . . , l2n´3, v1, u2q,
. . . ,
vn´1 “ T
cplpn2´nq{2, v1, . . . , vpn´2q, un´1q,
vn “ T
dpv1, . . . , vn´1, unq,
vn`1 “ T
epv2, . . . , vn, un`1q,
vn`2 “ T
tpv3, . . . , vn`1, un`2q,
. . .
(3)
Therefore we obtain the following ciphertext v1v2 . . . vk.
Taking in consideration Lemma 2 we can say that the deciphering algorithm can be con-
structed similar to the deciphering Algorithm given in [4, 5].
Example 4. We construct ternary groupoid pR3, fq, R3 “ t0, 1, 2u, which is defined over the
ring pR3,`, ¨q of residues modulo 3 and which is invertible on the third place. We define ternary
operation f on the set R3 in the following way: fpx1, x2, x3q “ αx1 ` βx2 ` x3 “ x4, where
α0 “ 2, α1 “ 2, α2 “ 0, β0 “ 1, β1 “ 1, β2 “ 1.
Below T2,01 “ 2 means that fp2, 0, 1q “ 2 and so on.
We have:
T0,00 “ 0, T0,01 “ 1, T0,02 “ 2, T0,10 “ 0, T0,11 “ 1, T0,12 “ 2,
T0,20 “ 0, T0,21 “ 1, T0,22 “ 2, T1,00 “ 0, T1,01 “ 1, T1,02 “ 2,
T1,10 “ 0, T1,11 “ 1, T1,12 “ 2, T1,20 “ 0, T1,21 “ 1, T1,22 “ 2,
T2,00 “ 1, T2,01 “ 2, T2,02 “ 0, T2,10 “ 1, T2,11 “ 2, T2,12 “ 0,
T2,20 “ 1, T2,21 “ 2, T2,22 “ 0.
In this case p3.4qfpx1, x2, x4q “ x3 “ 2 ¨ αx1 ` 2 ¨ βx2 ` x4.
Check. fpx1, x2, x3q “ fpx1, x2,
p3.4qfpx1, x2, x4qq “ αx1 ` βx2 ` 2 ¨ αx1 ` 2 ¨ βx2 ` x4 “ x4.
p3.4qfpx1, x2, fpx1, x2, x3qq “ 2 ¨αx1`2 ¨βx2`αx1`βx2`x3 “ x3. We propose the following
elements l1 “ 2, l2 “ 0, l3 “ 2 as leader elements. In Algorithm 3 we put a “ 1, b “ 2, c “ 1,
d “ 2 and so on.
In this case open text 2 0 1 1 2 1 is transformed in the following crypto-text:
T 1l1,l2u1 “ fpl1, l2, u1q “ fp2, 0, 2q “ 0 “ v1,
T 2l3,v1u2 “ fp2, 0, fp2, 0, 0qq “ fp2, 0, 1q “ 2 “ v2,
T 1v1,v2u3 “ fp0, 2, 1q “ 1 “ v3,
T 2v2,v3u4 “ fp2, 1, fp2, 1, 1qq “ fp2, 1, 2q “ 0 “ v4,
T 1v3,v4u5 “ fp1, 0, 2q “ 2 “ v5,
T 2v4,v5u6 “ fp0, 2, fp0, 2, 1qq “ fp0, 2, 1q “ 1 “ v6.
We obtain the following crypto-text 0 2 1 0 2 1.
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We have the following deciphering procedure. Notice that in conditions of this example the
following fact is true: T´1px, y,´q “ T 2px, y,´q.
T 2l1,l2v1 “ fpl1, l2, fpl1, l2, v1qq “ fp2, 0, fp2, 0, 0qq “ fp2, 0, 1q “ 2 “ u1,
T 1l3,v1v2 “ fp2, 0, 2q “ 0 “ u2,
T 2v1,v2v3 “ fp0, 2, fp0, 2, 1qq “ fp0, 2, 1q “ 1 “ u3,
T 1v2,v3v4 “ fpv2, v3, v4q “ fp2, 1, 0q “ 1 “ u4,
T 2v3,v4v5 “ fpv3, v4, fpv3, v4, v5qq “ fp1, 0, fp1, 0, 2qq “ fp1, 0, 2q “ 2 “ u5,
T 1v4,v5v6 “ fp0, 2, 1q “ 1 “ u6.
Therefore we have the following open text: 2 0 1 1 2 1.
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